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Updated Guidelines
for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems
Recommendations from the Guidelines Working Group
Summary
The purpose of evaluating public health surveillance systems is to ensure that
problems of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and
effectively. CDC’s Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems are being
updated to address the need for a) the integration of surveillance and health
information systems, b) the establishment of data standards, c) the electronic
exchange of health data, and d) changes in the objectives of public health
surveillance to facilitate the response of public health to emerging health threats
(e.g., new diseases). This report provides updated guidelines for evaluating
surveillance systems based on CDC’s Framework for Program Evaluation in
Public Health, research and discussion of concerns related to public health
surveillance systems, and comments received from the public health
community. The guidelines in this report describe many tasks and related
activities that can be applied to public health surveillance systems.
INTRODUCTION
In 1988, CDC published Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems  (1 ) to pro-
mote the best use of public health resources through the development of efficient and
effective public health surveillance systems. CDC’s Guidelines for Evaluating Surveil-
lance Systems  are being updated to address the need for a) the integration of surveil-
lance and health information systems, b) the establishment of data standards, c) the
electronic exchange of health data, and d) changes in the objectives of public health
surveillance to facilitate the response of public health to emerging health threats (e.g.,
new diseases). For example, CDC, with the collaboration of state and local health
departments, is implementing the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System
(NEDSS) to better manage and enhance the large number of current surveillance sys-
tems and allow the public health community to respond more quickly to public health
threats (e.g., outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism) (2 ). When
NEDSS is completed, it will electronically integrate and link together several types of
surveillance systems with the use of standard data formats; a communications infra-
structure built on principles of public health informatics; and agreements on data
access, sharing, and confidentiality. In addition, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandates that the United States adopt national
uniform standards for electronic transactions related to health insurance enrollment
and eligibility, health-care encounters, and health insurance claims; for identifiers for
health-care providers, payers and individuals, as well as code sets and classification
systems used in these transactions; and for security of these transactions (3 ). The elec-
tronic exchange of health data inherently involves the protection of patient privacy.
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Based on CDC’s Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health  (4 ), research
and discussion of concerns related to public health surveillance systems, and com-
ments received from the public health community, this report provides updated guide-
lines for evaluating public health surveillance systems.
BACKGROUND
Public health surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpreta-
tion, and dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in public health
action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health (5–7 ). Data dissemi-
nated by a public health surveillance system can be used for immediate public health
action, program planning and evaluation, and formulating research hypotheses. For
example, data from a public health surveillance system can be used to
• guide immediate action for cases of public health importance;
• measure the burden of a disease (or other health-related event), including
changes in related factors, the identification of populations at high risk, and the
identification of new or emerging health concerns;
• monitor trends in the burden of a disease (or other health-related event), including
the detection of epidemics (outbreaks) and pandemics;
• guide the planning, implementation, and evaluation of programs to prevent and
control disease, injury, or adverse exposure;
• evaluate public policy;
• detect changes in health practices and the effects of these changes;
• prioritize the allocation of health resources;
• describe the clinical course of disease; and
• provide a basis for epidemiologic research.
Public health surveillance activities are generally authorized by legislators and car-
ried out by public health officials. Public health surveillance systems have been devel-
oped to address a range of public health needs. In addition, public health information
systems have been defined to include a variety of data sources essential to public health
action and are often used for surveillance (8 ). These systems vary from a simple sys-
tem collecting data from a single source, to electronic systems that receive data from
many sources in multiple formats, to complex surveys. The number and variety of
systems will likely increase with advances in electronic data interchange and integra-
tion of data, which will also heighten the importance of patient privacy, data confiden-
tiality, and system security. Appropriate institutions/agencies/scientific officials should
be consulted with any projects regarding pubic health surveillance.
Variety might also increase with the range of health-related events under surveil-
lance. In these guidelines, the term “health-related event” refers to any subject related
to a public health surveillance system. For example, a health-related event could
include infectious, chronic, or zoonotic diseases; injuries; exposures to toxic substances;
health promoting or damaging behaviors; and other surveilled events associated with
public health action.
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The purpose of evaluating public health surveillance systems is to ensure that prob-
lems of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and effectively. Public
health surveillance systems should be evaluated periodically, and the evaluation should
include recommendations for improving quality, efficiency, and usefulness. The goal of
these guidelines is to organize the evaluation of a public health surveillance system.
Broad topics are outlined into which program-specific qualities can be integrated. Evalu-
ation of a public health surveillance system focuses on how well the system operates to
meet its purpose and objectives.
The evaluation of public health surveillance systems should involve an assessment
of system attributes, including simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, sensitiv-
ity, predictive value positive, representativeness, timeliness, and stability. With the con-
tinuing advancement of technology and the importance of information architecture
and related concerns, inherent in these attributes are certain public health informatics
concerns for public health surveillance systems. These concerns include comparable
hardware and software, standard user interface, standard data format and coding,
appropriate quality checks, and adherence to confidentiality and security standards
(9 ). Because public health surveillance systems vary in methods, scope, purpose, and
objectives, attributes that are important to one system might be less important to
another. A public health surveillance system should emphasize those attributes that
are most important for the objectives of the system. Efforts to improve certain attributes
(e.g., the ability of a public health surveillance system to detect a health-related event
[sensitivity]) might detract from other attributes (e.g., simplicity or timeliness). An evalu-
ation of the public health surveillance system must therefore consider those attributes
that are of the highest priority for a given system and its objectives. Considering the
attributes that are of the highest priority, the guidelines in this report describe many
tasks and related activities that can be applied in the evaluation of public health surveil-
lance systems, with the understanding that all activities under the tasks might not be
appropriate for all systems.
Organization of This Report
This report begins with descriptions of each of the tasks involved in evaluating a
public health surveillance system. These tasks are adapted from the steps in program
evaluation in the Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health  (4 ) as well as
from the elements in the original guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems (1 ).
The report concludes with a summary statement regarding evaluating surveillance sys-
tems. A checklist that can be detached or photocopied and used when the evaluation is
implemented is also included (Appendix A).
To assess the quality of the evaluation activities, relevant standards are provided for
each of the tasks for evaluating a public health surveillance system (Appendix B). These
standards are adapted from the standards for effective evaluation (i.e., utility, feasibil-
ity, propriety, and accuracy) in the Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health
(4 ). Because all activities under the evaluation tasks might not be appropriate for all
systems, only those standards that are appropriate to an evaluation should be used.
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Task A. Engage the Stakeholders in the Evaluation
Stakeholders can provide input to ensure that the evaluation of a public health
surveillance system addresses appropriate questions and assesses pertinent attributes
and that its findings will be acceptable and useful. In that context, we define stakehold-
ers as those persons or organizations who use data for the promotion of healthy
lifestyles and the prevention and control of disease, injury, or adverse exposure. Those
stakeholders who might be interested in defining questions to be addressed by the
surveillance system evaluation and subsequently using the findings from it are public
health practitioners; health-care providers; data providers and users; representatives
of affected communities; governments at the local, state, and federal levels; and pro-
fessional and private nonprofit organizations.
Task B. Describe the Surveillance System to be Evaluated
Activities
• Describe the public health importance of the health-related event under
surveillance.
• Describe the purpose and operation of the system.
• Describe the resources used to operate the system.
Discussion
To construct a balanced and reliable description of the system, multiple sources of
information might be needed. The description of the system can be improved by con-
sulting with a variety of persons involved with the system and by checking reported
descriptions of the system against direct observation.
B.1. Describe the Public Health Importance of the Health-Related Event
Under Surveillance
Definition. The public health importance of a health-related event and the need to
have that event under surveillance can be described in several ways. Health-related
events that affect many persons or that require large expenditures of resources are of
public health importance. However, health-related events that affect few persons might
also be important, especially if the events cluster in time and place (e.g., a limited out-
break of a severe disease). In other instances, public concerns might focus attention on
a particular health-related event, creating or heightening the importance of an evalua-
tion. Diseases that are now rare because of successful control measures might be per-
ceived as unimportant, but their level of importance should be assessed as a possible
sentinel health-related event or for their potential to reemerge. Finally, the public health
importance of a health-related event is influenced by its level of preventability (10 ).
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Measures. Parameters for measuring the importance of a health-related event—
and therefore the public health surveillance system with which it is monitored—can
include (7 )
• indices of frequency (e.g., the total number of cases and/or deaths; incidence
rates, prevalence, and/or mortality rates); and summary measures of population
health status (e.g., quality-adjusted life years [QALYS]);
• indices of severity (e.g., bed-disability days, case-fatality ratio, and hospitalization
rates and/or disability rates);
• disparities or inequities associated with the health-related event;
• costs associated with the health-related event;
• preventability (10 );
• potential clinical course in the absence of an intervention (e.g., vaccinations)
(11,12 ); and
• public interest.
Efforts have been made to provide summary measures of population health status
that can be used to make comparative assessments of the health needs of populations
(13 ). Perhaps the best known of these measures are QALYs, years of healthy life (YHLs),
and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). Based on attributes that represent health
status and life expectancy, QALYs, YHLs, and DALYs provide one-dimensional mea-
sures of overall health. In addition, attempts have been made to quantify the public
health importance of various diseases and other health-related events. In a study that
describes such an approach, a score was used that takes into account age-specific
morbidity and mortality rates as well as health-care costs (14 ). Another study used a
model that ranks public health concerns according to size, urgency, severity of the prob-
lem, economic loss, effect on others, effectiveness, propriety, economics, acceptability,
legality of solutions, and availability of resources (15 ).
Preventability can be defined at several levels, including primary prevention (pre-
venting the occurrence of disease or other health-related event), secondary prevention
(early detection and intervention with the aim of reversing, halting, or at least retarding
the progress of a condition), and tertiary prevention (minimizing the effects of disease
and disability among persons already ill). For infectious diseases, preventability can
also be described as reducing the secondary attack rate or the number of cases trans-
mitted to contacts of the primary case. From the perspective of surveillance, prevent-
ability reflects the potential for effective public health intervention at any of these levels.
B.2. Describe the Purpose and Operation of the Surveillance System
Methods. Methods for describing the operation of the public health surveillance
system include
• List the purpose and objectives of the system.
• Describe the planned uses of the data from the system.
• Describe the health-related event under surveillance, including the case definition
for each specific condition.
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• Cite any legal authority for the data collection.
• Describe where in the organization(s) the system resides, including the context
(e.g., the political, administrative, geographic, or social climate) in which the
system evaluation will be done.
• Describe the level of integration with other systems, if appropriate.
• Draw a flow chart of the system.
• Describe the components of the system. For example
— What is the population under surveillance?
— What is the period of time of the data collection?
— What data are collected and how are they collected?
— What are the reporting sources of data for the system?
— How are the system’s data managed (e.g., the transfer, entry, editing, storage,
and back up of data)? Does the system comply with applicable standards for
data formats and coding schemes? If not, why?
— How are the system’s data analyzed and disseminated?
— What policies and procedures are in place to ensure patient privacy, data
confidentiality, and system security? What is the policy and procedure for
releasing data? Do these procedures comply with applicable federal and state
statutes and regulations? If not, why?
— Does the system comply with an applicable records management program?
For example, are the system’s records properly archived and/or disposed of?
Discussion. The purpose of the system indicates why the system exists, whereas its
objectives relate to how the data are used for public health action. The objectives of a
public health surveillance system, for example, might address immediate public health
action, program planning and evaluation, and formation of research hypotheses (see
Background). The purpose and objectives of the system, including the planned uses of
its data, establish a frame of reference for evaluating specific components.
A public health surveillance system is dependent on a clear case definition for the
health-related event under surveillance (7 ). The case definition of a health-related event
can include clinical manifestations (i.e., symptoms), laboratory results, epidemiologic
information (e.g., person, place, and time), and/or specified behaviors, as well as levels
of certainty (e.g., confirmed/definite, probable/presumptive, or possible/suspected). The
use of a standard case definition increases the specificity of reporting and improves the
comparability of the health-related event reported from different sources of data,
including geographic areas. Case definitions might exist for a variety of health-related
events under surveillance, including diseases, injuries, adverse exposures, and risk fac-
tor or protective behaviors. For example, in the United States, CDC and the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have agreed on standard case definitions
for selected infectious diseases (16 ). In addition, CSTE publishes Position Papers that
discuss and define a variety of health-related events (17 ). When possible, a public health
surveillance system should use an established case definition, and if it does not, an
explanation should be provided.
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The evaluation should assess how well the public health surveillance system is inte-
grated with other surveillance and health information systems (e.g., data exchange
and sharing in multiple formats, and transformation of data). Streamlining related sys-
tems into an integrated public health surveillance network enables individual systems
to meet specific data collection needs while avoiding the duplication of effort and lack
of standardization that can arise from independent systems (18 ). An integrated system
can address comorbidity concerns (e.g., persons infected with human immunodefi-
ciency virus and Mycobacterium tuberculosis ); identify previously unrecognized risk
factors; and provide the means for monitoring additional outcomes from a health-
related event. When CDC’s NEDSS is completed, it will electronically integrate and link
together several types of surveillance activities and facilitate more accurate and timely
reporting of disease information to CDC and state and local health departments (2 ).
CSTE has organized professional discussion among practicing public health epide-
miologists at state and federal public health agencies. CSTE has also proposed a
national public health surveillance system to serve as a basis for local and state public
health agencies to a) prioritize surveillance and health information activities and
b) advocate for necessary resources for public health agencies at all levels (19 ). This
national public health system would be a conceptual framework and virtual surveil-
lance system that incorporates both existing and new surveillance systems for health-
related events and their determinants.
Listing the discrete steps that are taken in processing the health-event reports by
the system and then depicting these steps in a flow chart is often useful. An example of
a simplified flow chart for a generic public health surveillance system is included in this
report (Figure 1). The mandates and business processes of the lead agency that oper-
ates the system and the participation of other agencies could be included in this chart.
The architecture and data flow of the system can also be depicted in the chart (20,21 ).
A chart of architecture and data flow should be sufficiently detailed to explain all of the
functions of the system, including average times between steps and data transfers.
The description of the components of the public health surveillance system could
include discussions related to public health informatics concerns, including compa-
rable hardware and software, standard user interface, standard data format and cod-
ing, appropriate quality checks, and adherence to confidentiality and security standards
(9 ). For example, comparable hardware and software, standard user interface, and
standard data format and coding facilitate efficient data exchange, and a set of com-
mon data elements are important for effectively matching data within the system or to
other systems.
To document the information needs of public health, CDC, in collaboration with
state and local health departments, is developing the Public Health Conceptual Data
Model to a) establish data standards for public health, including data definitions, com-
ponent structures (e.g., for complex data types), code values, and data use; b) collabo-
rate with national health informatics standard-setting bodies to define standards for
the exchange of information among public health agencies and health-care providers;
and c) construct computerized information systems that conform to established data
and data interchange standards for use in the management of data relevant to public
health (22 ). In addition, the description of the system’s data management might ad-
dress who is editing the data, how and at what levels the data are edited, and what
checks are in place to ensure data quality.
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In response to HIPAA mandates, various standard development organizations and
terminology and coding groups are working collaboratively to harmonize their sepa-
rate systems (23 ). For example, both the Accredited Standards Committee X12 (24 ),
which has dealt principally with standards for health insurance transactions, and Health
Level Seven (HL7) (25 ), which has dealt with standards for clinical messaging and
exchange of clinical information with health-care organizations (e.g., hospitals), have
collaborated on a standardized approach for providing supplementary information to
support health-care claims (26 ). In the area of classification and coding of diseases and
other medical terms, the National Library of Medicine has traditionally provided the
Unified Medical Language System, a metathesaurus for clinical coding systems that
allows terms in one coding system to be mapped to another (27 ). The passage of
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HIPAA and the anticipated adoption of standards for electronic medical records have
increased efforts directed toward the integration of clinical terminologies (23 ) (e.g., the
merge of the College of American Pathologists’ Systematized Nomenclature of Medi-
cine [SNOMED®] [28 ] and the British Read Codes, the National Health Service thesau-
rus of health-care terms in Great Britain).
The data analysis description might indicate who analyzes the data, how they are
analyzed, and how often. This description could also address how the system ensures
that appropriate scientific methods are used to analyze the data.
The public health surveillance system should operate in a manner that allows effec-
tive dissemination of health data so that decision makers at all levels can readily under-
stand the implications of the information (7 ). Options for disseminating data and/or
information from the system include electronic data interchange; public-use data files;
the Internet; press releases; newsletters; bulletins; annual and other types of reports;
publication in scientific, peer-reviewed journals; and poster and oral presentations,
including those at individual, community, and professional meetings. The audiences
for health data and information can include public health practitioners, health-care pro-
viders, members of affected communities, professional and voluntary organizations,
policymakers, the press, and the general public.
In conducting surveillance, public health agencies are authorized to collect personal
health data about persons and thus have an obligation to protect against inappropriate
use or release of that data. The protection of patient privacy (recognition of a person’s
right not to share information about him or herself), data confidentiality (assurance of
authorized data sharing), and system security (assurance of authorized system access)
is essential to maintaining the credibility of any surveillance system. This protection
must ensure that data in a surveillance system regarding a person’s health status are
shared only with authorized persons. Physical, administrative, operational, and com-
puter safeguards for securing the system and protecting its data must allow authorized
access while denying access by unauthorized users.
A related concern in protecting health data is data release, including procedures for
releasing record-level data; aggregate tabular data; and data in computer-based, inter-
active query systems. Even though personal identifiers are removed before data are
released, the removal of these identifiers might not be a sufficient safeguard for shar-
ing health data. For example, the inclusion of demographic information in a line-listed
data file for a small number of cases could lead to indirect identification of a person
even though personal identifiers were not provided. In the United States, CDC and
CSTE have negotiated a policy for the release of data from the National Notifiable
Disease Surveillance System (29 ) to facilitate its use for public health while preserving
the confidentiality of the data (30 ). The policy is being evaluated for revision by CDC
and CSTE.
Standards for the privacy of individually identifiable health data have been pro-
posed in response to HIPAA (3 ). A model state law has been composed to address
privacy, confidentiality, and security concerns arising from the acquisition, use, disclo-
sure, and storage of health information by public health agencies at the state and local
levels (31 ). In addition, the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology’s series of
Statistical Policy Working Papers  includes reviews of statistical methods used by
federal agencies and their contractors that release statistical tables or microdata files
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that are collected from persons, businesses, or other units under a pledge of confiden-
tiality. These working papers contain basic statistical methods to limit disclosure (e.g.,
rules for data suppression to protect privacy and to minimize mistaken inferences from
small numbers) and provide recommendations for improving disclosure limitation
practices (32 ).
A public health surveillance system might be legally required to participate in a
records management program. Records can consist of a variety of materials (e.g., com-
pleted forms, electronic files, documents, and reports) that are connected with operat-
ing the surveillance system. The proper management of these records prevents a “loss
of memory” or “cluttered memory” for the agency that operates the system, and
enhances the system’s ability to meet its objectives.
B.3. Describe the Resources Used to Operate the Surveillance System
Definition. In this report, the methods for assessing resources cover only those
resources directly required to operate a public health surveillance system. These
resources are sometimes referred to as “direct costs” and include the personnel and
financial resources expended in operating the system.
Methods. In describing these resources consider the following:
• Funding source(s): Specify the source of funding for the surveillance system. In the
United States, public health surveillance often results from a collaboration among
federal, state, and local governments.
• Personnel requirements: Estimate the time it takes to operate the system, including
the collection, editing, analysis, and dissemination of data (e.g., person-time
expended per year of operation). These measures can be converted to dollar
estimates by multiplying the person-time by appropriate salary and benefit costs.
• Other resources: Determine the cost of other resources, including travel, training,
supplies, computer and other equipment, and related services (e.g., mail, telephone,
computer support, Internet connections, laboratory support, and hardware and
software maintenance).
When appropriate, the description of the system’s resources should consider all
levels of the public health system, from the local health-care provider to municipal,
county, state, and federal health agencies. Resource estimation for public health sur-
veillance systems have been implemented in Vermont (Table 1) and Kentucky (Table 2).
Resource Estimation in Vermont. Two methods of collecting public health surveil-
lance data in Vermont were compared (33 ). The passive system was already in place
and consisted of unsolicited reports of notifiable diseases to the district offices or state
health department. The active system was implemented in a probability sample of
physician practices. Each week, a health department employee called these practitio-
ners to solicit reports of selected notifiable diseases.
In comparing the two systems, an attempt was made to estimate their costs. The
estimates of direct expenses were computed for the public health surveillance systems
(Table 1).
Resource Estimation in Kentucky. Another example of resource estimation was pro-
vided by an assessment of the costs of a public health surveillance system involving
the active solicitation of case reports of type A hepatitis in Kentucky (Table 2) (34 ). The
resources that were invested into the direct operation of the system in 1983 were for
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TABLE 1.  Comparison of estimated expenses for health department active and passive








Public health nurse 14,025 0
Total $19,271 $2,303
*Vogt RL, LaRue D, Klaucke DN, Jillson DA. Comparison of an active and passive surveillance
system of primary care providers for hepatitis, measles, rubella, and salmonellosis in Vermont.
Am J Public Health 1983;73:795–7.
† Active surveillance — weekly calls were made from health departments requesting reports.
§ Passive surveillance — provider-initiated reporting.
personnel and telephone expenses and were estimated at $3,764 and $535, respec-
tively. Nine more cases were found through this system than would have been found
through the passive surveillance system, and an estimated seven hepatitis cases were
prevented through administering prophylaxis to the contacts of the nine case-patients.
Discussion. This approach to assessing resources includes only those personnel
and material resources required for the operation of surveillance and excludes a broader
definition of costs that might be considered in a more comprehensive evaluation. For
example, the assessment of resources could include the estimation of indirect costs
(e.g., follow-up laboratory tests) and costs of secondary data sources (e.g., vital statis-
tics or survey data).
The assessment of the system’s operational resources should not be done in isola-
tion of the program or initiative that relies on the public health surveillance system. A
more formal economic evaluation of the system (i.e., judging costs relative to benefits)
could be included with the resource description. Estimating the effect of the system on
decision making, treatment, care, prevention, education, and/or research might be pos-
sible (35,36 ). For some surveillance systems, however, a more realistic approach would
be to judge costs based on the objectives and usefulness of the system.
Task C. Focus the Evaluation Design
Definition
The direction and process of the evaluation must be focused to ensure that time and
resources are used as efficiently as possible.
Methods
Focusing the evaluation design for a public health surveillance system involves
• determining the specific purpose of the evaluation (e.g., a change in practice);
• identifying stakeholders (Task A) who will receive the findings and recommen-
dations of the evaluation (i.e., the intended users);
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• considering what will be done with the information generated from the evaluation
(i.e., the intended uses);
• specifying the questions that will be answered by the evaluation; and
• determining standards for assessing the performance of the system.
Discussion
Depending on the specific purpose of the evaluation, its design could be straightfor-
ward or complex. An effective evaluation design is contingent upon a) its specific pur-
pose being understood by all of the stakeholders in the evaluation and b) persons who
need to know the findings and recommendations of the design being committed to
using the information generated from it. In addition, when multiple stakeholders are
involved, agreements that clarify roles and responsibilities might need to be estab-
lished among those who are implementing the evaluation.
Standards for assessing how the public health surveillance system performs estab-
lish what the system must accomplish to be considered successful in meeting its objec-
tives. These standards specify, for example, what levels of usefulness and simplicity
are relevant for the system, given its objectives. Approaches to setting useful stan-
dards for assessing the system’s performance include a review of current scientific
literature on the health-related event under surveillance and/or consultation with
appropriate specialists, including users of the data.














Immune serum globulin 21
Total $5,616
* Hinds MW, Skaggs JW, Bergeisen GH. Benefit-cost analysis of active surveillance of primary
care physicians for hepatitis A. Am J Public Health 1985;75:176–7.
† Costs of tracing and providing prophylaxis to 38 additional active surveillance-associated
contacts of persons with hepatitis A.
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Task D. Gather Credible Evidence Regarding the Performance
of the Surveillance System
Activities
• Indicate the level of usefulness by describing the actions taken as a result of
analysis and interpretation of the data from the public health surveillance system.
Characterize the entities that have used the data to make decisions and take
actions. List other anticipated uses of the data.











Public health informatics concerns for public health surveillance systems (see Task
B.2, Discussion) can be addressed in the evidence gathered regarding the performance
of the system. Evidence of the system’s performance must be viewed as credible. For
example, the gathered evidence must be reliable, valid, and informative for its intended
use. Many potential sources of evidence regarding the system’s performance exist,
including consultations with physicians, epidemiologists, statisticians, behavioral sci-
entists, public health practitioners, laboratory directors, program managers, data pro-
viders, and data users.
D.1. Indicate the Level of Usefulness
Definition. A public health surveillance system is useful if it contributes to the pre-
vention and control of adverse health-related events, including an improved under-
standing of the public health implications of such events. A public health surveillance
system can also be useful if it helps to determine that an adverse health-related event
previously thought to be unimportant is actually important. In addition, data from a
surveillance system can be useful in contributing to performance measures (37 ),
including health indicators (38 ) that are used in needs assessments and accountability
systems.
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Methods. An assessment of the usefulness of a public health surveillance system
should begin with a review of the objectives of the system and should consider the
system’s effect on policy decisions and disease-control programs. Depending on the
objectives of a particular surveillance system, the system might be considered useful if
it satisfactorily addresses at least one of the following questions. Does the system
• detect diseases, injuries, or adverse or protective exposures of public importance
in a timely way to permit accurate diagnosis or identification, prevention or
treatment, and handling of contacts when appropriate?
• provide estimates of the magnitude of morbidity and mortality related to the
health-related event under surveillance, including the identification of factors
associated with the event?
• detect trends that signal changes in the occurrence of disease, injury, or adverse
or protective exposure, including detection of epidemics (or outbreaks)?
• permit assessment of the effect of prevention and control programs?
• lead to improved clinical, behavioral, social, policy, or environmental practices?
or
• stimulate research intended to lead to prevention or control?
A survey of persons who use data from the system might be helpful in gathering
evidence regarding the usefulness of the system. The survey could be done either for-
mally with standard methodology or informally.
Discussion. Usefulness might be affected by all the attributes of a public health
surveillance system (see Task D.2, Describe Each System Attribute). For example,
increased sensitivity might afford a greater opportunity for identifying outbreaks and
understanding the natural course of an adverse health-related event in the population
under surveillance. Improved timeliness allows control and prevention activities to be
initiated earlier. Increased predictive value positive enables public health officials to
more accurately focus resources for control and prevention measures. A representa-
tive surveillance system will better characterize the epidemiologic characteristics of a
health-related event in a defined population. Public health surveillance systems that
are simple, flexible, acceptable, and stable will likely be more complete and useful for
public health action.
D.2. Describe Each System Attribute
D.2.a. Simplicity
Definition. The simplicity of a public health surveillance system refers to both its
structure and ease of operation. Surveillance systems should be as simple as possible
while still meeting their objectives.
Methods. A chart describing the flow of data and the lines of response in a surveil-
lance system can help assess the simplicity or complexity of a surveillance system. A
simplified flow chart for a generic surveillance system is included in this report (Figure 1).
The following measures (see Task B.2) might be considered in evaluating the sim-
plicity of a system:
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• amount and type of data necessary to establish that the health-related event has
occurred (i.e., the case definition has been met);
• amount and type of other data on cases (e.g., demographic, behavioral, and
exposure information for the health-related event);
• number of organizations involved in receiving case reports;
• level of integration with other systems;
• method of collecting the data, including number and types of reporting sources,
and time spent on collecting data;
• amount of follow-up that is necessary to update data on the case;
• method of managing the data, including time spent on transferring, entering,
editing, storing, and backing up data;
• methods for analyzing and disseminating the data, including time spent on
preparing the data for dissemination;
• staff training requirements; and
• time spent on maintaining the system.
Discussion. Thinking of the simplicity of a public health surveillance system from
the design perspective might be useful. An example of a system that is simple in design
is one with a case definition that is easy to apply (i.e., the case is easily ascertained) and
in which the person identifying the case will also be the one analyzing and using the
information. A more complex system might involve some of the following:
• special or follow-up laboratory tests to confirm the case;
• investigation of the case, including telephone contact or a home visit by public
health personnel to collect detailed information;
• multiple levels of reporting (e.g., with the National Notifiable Diseases
Surveillance System, case reports might start with the health-care provider who
makes the diagnosis and pass through county and state health departments
before going to CDC [29 ]); and
• integration of related systems whereby special training is required to collect and/
or interpret data.
Simplicity is closely related to acceptance and timeliness. Simplicity also affects the
amount of resources required to operate the system.
D.2.b. Flexibility
Definition. A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to changing infor-
mation needs or operating conditions with little additional time, personnel, or allocated
funds. Flexible systems can accommodate, for example, new health-related events,
changes in case definitions or technology, and variations in funding or reporting
sources. In addition, systems that use standard data formats (e.g., in electronic data
interchange) can be easily integrated with other systems and thus might be considered
flexible.
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Methods. Flexibility is probably best evaluated retrospectively by observing how a
system has responded to a new demand. An important characteristic of CDC’s Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is its flexibility (39 ). Conducted in col-
laboration with state health departments, BRFSS is an ongoing sample survey that
gathers and reports state-level prevalence data on health behaviors related to the lead-
ing preventable causes of death as well as data on preventive health practices. The
system permits states to add questions of their own design to the BRFSS questionnaire
but is uniform enough to allow state-to-state comparisons for certain questions. These
state-specific questions can address emergent and locally important health concerns.
In addition, states can stratify their BRFSS samples to estimate prevalence data for
regions or counties within their respective states.
Discussion. Unless efforts have been made to adapt the public health surveillance
system to another disease (or other health-related event), a revised case definition,
additional data sources, new information technology, or changes in funding, assessing
the flexibility of that system might be difficult. In the absence of practical experience,
the design and workings of a system can be examined. Simpler systems might be more
flexible (i.e., fewer components will need to be modified when adapting the system for
a change in information needs or operating conditions).
D.2.c. Data Quality
Definition. Data quality reflects the completeness and validity of the data recorded
in the public health surveillance system.
Methods. Examining the percentage of “unknown” or “blank” responses to items
on surveillance forms is a straightforward and easy measure of data quality. Data of
high quality will have low percentages of such responses. However, a full assessment
of the completeness and validity of the system’s data might require a special study.
Data values recorded in the surveillance system can be compared to “true” values
through, for example, a review of sampled data (40 ), a special record linkage (41 ), or
patient interview (42 ). In addition, the calculation of sensitivity (Task D.2.e) and predic-
tive value positive (Task D.2.f) for the system’s data fields might be useful in assessing
data quality.
Quality of data is influenced by the performance of the screening and diagnostic
tests (i.e., the case definition) for the health-related event, the clarity of hardcopy or
electronic surveillance forms, the quality of training and supervision of persons who
complete these surveillance forms, and the care exercised in data management. A
review of these facets of a public health surveillance system provides an indirect mea-
sure of data quality.
Discussion. Most surveillance systems rely on more than simple case counts. Data
commonly collected include the demographic characteristics of affected persons,
details about the health-related event, and the presence or absence of potential risk
factors. The quality of these data depends on their completeness and validity.
The acceptability (see Task D.2.d) and representativeness (Task D.2.g) of a public
health surveillance system are related to data quality. With data of high quality, the
system can be accepted by those who participate in it. In addition, the system can
accurately represent the health-related event under surveillance.
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D.2.d. Acceptability
Definition. Acceptability reflects the willingness of persons and organizations to
participate in the surveillance system.
Methods. Acceptability refers to the willingness of persons in the sponsoring agency
that operates the system and persons outside the sponsoring agency (e.g., persons
who are asked to report data) to use the system. To assess acceptability, the points of
interaction between the system and its participants must be considered (Figure 1),
including persons with the health-related event and those reporting cases.
Quantitative measures of acceptability can include
• subject or agency participation rate (if it is high, how quickly it was achieved);
• interview completion rates and question refusal rates (if the system involves
interviews);
• completeness of report forms;
• physician, laboratory, or hospital/facility reporting rate; and
• timeliness of data reporting.
Some of these measures might be obtained from a review of surveillance report
forms, whereas others would require special studies or surveys.
Discussion. Acceptability is a largely subjective attribute that encompasses the will-
ingness of persons on whom the public health surveillance system depends to provide
accurate, consistent, complete, and timely data. Some factors influencing the accept-
ability of a particular system are
• the public health importance of the health-related event;
• acknowledgment by the system of the person’s contribution;
• dissemination of aggregate data back to reporting sources and interested parties;
• responsiveness of the system to suggestions or comments;
• burden on time relative to available time;
• ease and cost of data reporting;
• federal and state statutory assurance of privacy and confidentiality;
• the ability of the system to protect privacy and confidentiality;
• federal and state statute requirements for data collection and case reporting; and
• participation from the community in which the system operates.
D.2.e. Sensitivity
Definition. The sensitivity of a surveillance system can be considered on two levels.
First, at the level of case reporting, sensitivity refers to the proportion of cases of a
disease (or other health-related event) detected by the surveillance system (43 ).
Second, sensitivity can refer to the ability to detect outbreaks, including the ability to
monitor changes in the number of cases over time.
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Methods. The measurement of the sensitivity of a public health surveillance system
is affected by the likelihood that
• certain diseases or other health-related events are occurring in the population
under surveillance;
• cases of certain health-related events are under medical care, receive laboratory
testing, or are otherwise coming to the attention of institutions subject to
reporting requirements;
• the health-related events will be diagnosed/identified, reflecting the skill of health-
care providers and the sensitivity of screening and diagnostic tests (i.e., the case
definition); and
• the case will be reported to the system.
These situations can be extended by analogy to public health surveillance systems
that do not fit the traditional disease care-provider model. For example, the sensitivity
of a telephone-based surveillance system of morbidity or risk factors is affected by
• the number of persons who have telephones, who are at home when the call is
placed, and who agree to participate;
• the ability of persons to understand the questions and correctly identify their
status; and
• the willingness of respondents to report their status.
The extent to which these situations are explored depends on the system and on the
resources available for assessing sensitivity. The primary emphasis in assessing sensi-
tivity — assuming that most reported cases are correctly classified — is to estimate the
proportion of the total number of cases in the population under surveillance being
detected by the system, represented by A/(A+C) in this report (Table 3).
Surveillance of vaccine-preventable diseases provides an example of where the
detection of outbreaks is a critical concern (44 ). Approaches that have been recom-
mended for improving sensitivity of reporting vaccine-preventable diseases might be
TABLE 3.  Calculation of sensitivity* and predictive value positive† for a surveillance
system
Detected Condition present








* Sensitivity = A/(A+C)
† Predictive value positive (PVP) = A/(A+B)
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applicable to other health-related events (44 ). For example, the sensitivity of a system
might be improved by
• conducting active surveillance (i.e., contacting all providers and institutions
responsible for reporting  cases);
• using external standards (or other surveillance indicators) to monitor the quality
of case reporting;
• identifying imported cases;
• tracking the number of cases of suspected disease that are reported, investigated,
and ruled out as cases;
• monitoring the diagnostic effort (e.g., tracking submission of laboratory requests
for diagnostic testing); and
• monitoring the circulation of the agent (e.g., virus or bacterium) that causes the
disease.
The capacity for a public health surveillance system to detect outbreaks (or other
changes in incidence and prevalence) might be enhanced substantially if detailed diag-
nostic tests are included in the system. For example, the use of molecular subtyping in
the surveillance of Escherichia coli  O157:H7 infections in Minnesota enabled the sur-
veillance system to detect outbreaks that would otherwise have gone unrecognized (45 ).
The measurement of the sensitivity of the surveillance system (Table 3) requires
a) collection of or access to data usually external to the system to determine the true
frequency of the condition in the population under surveillance (46 ) and b) validation
of the data collected by the system. Examples of data sources used to assess the sensi-
tivity of health information or public health surveillance systems include medical records
(47,48 ) and registries (49,50 ). In addition, sensitivity can be assessed through estima-
tions of the total cases in the population under surveillance by using capture-recapture
techniques (51,52 ).
To adequately assess the sensitivity of the public health surveillance system, calcu-
lating more than one measurement of the attribute might be necessary. For example,
sensitivity could be determined for the system’s data fields, for each data source or for
combinations of data sources (48 ), for specific conditions under surveillance (53 ), or
for each of several years (54 ). The use of a Venn diagram might help depict measure-
ments of sensitivity for combinations of the system’s data sources (55 ).
Discussion. A literature review can be helpful in determining sensitivity measure-
ments for a public health surveillance system (56 ). The assessment of the sensitivity of
each data source, including combinations of data sources, can determine if the elimina-
tion of a current data source or if the addition of a new data source would affect the
overall surveillance results (48 ).
A public health surveillance system that does not have high sensitivity can still be
useful in monitoring trends as long as the sensitivity remains reasonably constant over
time. Questions concerning sensitivity in surveillance systems most commonly arise
when changes in the occurrence of a health-related event are noted. Changes in sensi-
tivity can be precipitated by some circumstances (e.g., heightened awareness of a
health-related event, introduction of new diagnostic tests, and changes in the method
of conducting surveillance). A search for such “artifacts” is often an initial step in out-
break investigations.
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D.2.f. Predictive Value Positive
Definition. Predictive value positive (PVP) is the proportion of reported cases that
actually have the health-related event under surveillance (43 ).
Methods. The assessment of sensitivity and of PVP provide different perspectives
regarding how well the system is operating. Depending on the objectives of the public
health surveillance system, assessing PVP whenever sensitivity has been assessed
might be necessary (47–50,53 ). In this report, PVP is represented by A/(A+B) (Table 3).
In assessing PVP, primary emphasis is placed on the confirmation of cases reported
through the surveillance system. The effect of PVP on the use of public health resources
can be considered on two levels. At the level of case detection, PVP affects the amount
of resources used for case investigations. For example, in some states, every reported
case of type A hepatitis is promptly investigated by a public health nurse, and contacts
at risk are referred for prophylactic treatment. A surveillance system with low PVP, and
therefore frequent “false-positive” case reports, would lead to misdirected resources.
At the level of outbreak (or epidemic) detection, a high rate of erroneous case
reports might trigger an inappropriate outbreak investigation. Therefore, the propor-
tion of epidemics identified by the surveillance system that are true epidemics can be
used to assess this attribute.
Calculating the PVP might require that records be kept of investigations prompted
by information obtained from the public health surveillance system. At the level of case
detection, a record of the number of case investigations completed and the proportion
of reported persons who actually had the health-related event under surveillance would
allow the calculation of the PVP. At the level of outbreak detection, the review of per-
sonnel activity reports, travel records, and telephone logbooks might enable the
assessment of PVP. For some surveillance systems, however, a review of data external
to the system (e.g., medical records) might be necessary to confirm cases to calculate
PVP. Examples of data sources used to assess the PVP of health information or public
health surveillance systems include medical records (48,57 ), registries (49,58 ), and
death certificates (59 ).
To assess the PVP of the system adequately, calculating more than one measure-
ment of the attribute might be necessary. For example, PVP could be determined for
the system’s data fields, for each data source or combinations of data sources (48 ), or
for specific health-related events (49 ).
Discussion. PVP is important because a low value means that noncases might be
investigated, and outbreaks might be identified that are not true but are instead arti-
facts of the public health surveillance system (e.g., a “pseudo-outbreak”). False-positive
reports can lead to unnecessary interventions, and falsely detected outbreaks can lead
to costly investigations and undue concern in the population under surveillance. A
public health surveillance system with a high PVP will lead to fewer misdirected resources.
The PVP reflects the sensitivity and specificity of the case definition (i.e., the screen-
ing and diagnostic tests for the health-related event) and the prevalence of the health-
related event in the population under surveillance. The PVP can improve with increasing
specificity of the case definition. In addition, good communication between the per-
sons who report cases and the receiving agency can lead to an improved PVP.
D.2.g. Representativeness
Definition. A public health surveillance system that is representative accurately
describes the occurrence of a health-related event over time and its distribution in the
population by place and person.
Vol. 50 / No. RR-13 MMWR 21
Methods. Representativeness is assessed by comparing the characteristics of
reported events to all such actual events. Although the latter information is generally
not known, some judgment of the representativeness of surveillance data is possible,
based on knowledge of
• characteristics of the population, including, age, socioeconomic status, access to
health care, and geographic location (60 );
• clinical course of the disease or other health-related event (e.g., latency period,
mode of transmission, and outcome [e.g., death, hospitalization, or disability]);
• prevailing medical practices (e.g., sites performing diagnostic tests and
physician-referral patterns) (33,61 ); and
• multiple sources of data (e.g., mortality rates for comparison with incidence data
and laboratory reports for comparison with physician reports).
Representativeness can be examined through special studies that seek to identify a
sample of all cases. For example, the representativeness of a regional injury surveil-
lance system was examined using a systematic sample of injured persons (62 ). The
study examined statistical measures of population variables (e.g., age, sex, residence,
nature of injury, and hospital admission) and concluded that the differences in the dis-
tribution of injuries in the system’s database and their distribution in the sampled data
should not affect the ability of the surveillance system to achieve its objectives.
For many health-related events under surveillance, the proper analysis and inter-
pretation of the data require the calculation of rates. The denominators for these rate
calculations are often obtained from a completely separate data system maintained by
another agency (e.g., the United States Bureau of the Census in collaboration with state
governments [63 ]). The choice of an appropriate denominator for the rate calculation
should be given careful consideration to ensure an accurate representation of the health-
related event over time and by place and person. For example, numerators and
denominators must be comparable across categories (e.g., race [64 ], age, residence,
and/or time period), and the source for the denominator should be consistent over time
when measuring trends in rates. In addition, consideration should be given to the
selection of the standard population for the adjustment of rates (65 ).
Discussion. To generalize findings from surveillance data to the population at large,
the data from a public health surveillance system should accurately reflect the charac-
teristics of the health-related event under surveillance. These characteristics generally
relate to time, place, and person. An important result of evaluating the representative-
ness of a surveillance system is the identification of population subgroups that might
be systematically excluded from the reporting system through inadequate methods of
monitoring them. This evaluation process enables appropriate modification of data
collection procedures and more accurate projection of incidence of the health-related
event in the target population (66 ).
For certain health-related events, the accurate description of the event over time
involves targeting appropriate points in a broad spectrum of exposure and the result-
ant disease or condition. In the surveillance of cardiovascular diseases, for example, it
might be useful to distinguish between preexposure conditions (e.g., tobacco use poli-
cies and social norms), the exposure (e.g., tobacco use, diet, exercise, stress, and
genetics), a pre-symptomatic phase (e.g., cholesterol and homocysteine levels), early-
staged disease (e.g., abnormal stress test), late-staged disease (e.g., angina and acute
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myocardial infarction), and death from the disease. The measurement of risk factor
behaviors (e.g., tobacco use) might enable the monitoring of important aspects in the
development of a disease or other health-related event.
Because surveillance data are used to identify groups at high risk and to target and
evaluate interventions, being aware of the strengths and limitations of the system’s
data is important. Errors and bias can be introduced into the system at any stage (67 ).
For example, case ascertainment (or selection) bias can result from changes in report-
ing practices over time or from differences in reporting practices by geographic loca-
tion or by health-care providers. Differential reporting among population subgroups
can result in misleading conclusions about the health-related event under surveillance.
D.2.h. Timeliness
Definition. Timeliness reflects the speed between steps in a public health surveil-
lance system.
Methods. A simplified example of the steps in a public health surveillance system is
included in this report (Figure 2). The time interval linking any two of these steps can be
examined. The interval usually considered first is the amount of time between the
onset of a health-related event and the reporting of that event to the public health
agency responsible for instituting control and prevention measures. Factors affecting
the time involved during this interval can include the patient’s recognition of symp-
toms, the patient’s acquisition of medical care, the attending physician’s diagnosis or
FIGURE 2. Simplified example of steps in a surveillance system
Occurrence of health-related event
Health-related event recognized 
by reporting source
Health-related event reported
to responsible public health agency
Control and prevention activities Feedback to stakeholders
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submission of a laboratory test, the laboratory reporting test results back to the physi-
cian and/or to a public health agency, and the physician reporting the event to a public
health agency. Another aspect of timeliness is the time required for the identification of
trends, outbreaks, or the effect of control and prevention measures. Factors that influ-
ence the identification process can include the severity and communicability of the
health-related event, staffing of the responsible public health agency, and communica-
tion among involved health agencies and organizations. The most relevant time inter-
val might vary with the type of health-related event under surveillance. With acute or
infectious diseases, for example, the interval from the onset of symptoms or the date of
exposure might be used. With chronic diseases, it might be more useful to look at
elapsed time from diagnosis rather than from the date of symptom onset.
Discussion. The timeliness of a public health surveillance system should be evalu-
ated in terms of availability of information for control of a health-related event, includ-
ing immediate control efforts, prevention of continued exposure, or program planning.
The need for rapidity of response in a surveillance system depends on the nature of the
health-related event under surveillance and the objectives of that system. A study of a
public health surveillance system for Shigella  infections, for example, indicated that
the typical case of shigellosis was brought to the attention of health officials 11 days
after onset of symptoms — a period sufficient for the occurrence of secondary and
tertiary transmission. This example indicates that the level of timeliness was not satis-
factory for effective disease control (68 ). However, when a long period of latency
occurs between exposure and appearance of disease, the rapid identification of cases
of illness might not be as important as the rapid availability of exposure data to provide
a basis for interrupting and preventing exposures that lead to disease. For example,
children with elevated blood lead levels and no clinically apparent illness are at risk for
adverse health-related events. CDC recommends that follow-up of asymptomatic chil-
dren with elevated blood lead levels include educational activities regarding lead poi-
soning prevention and investigation and remediation of sources of lead exposure (69 ).
In addition, surveillance data are being used by public health agencies to track progress
toward national and state health objectives (38,70 ).
The increasing use of electronic data collection from reporting sources (e.g., an elec-
tronic laboratory-based surveillance system) and via the Internet (a web-based sys-
tem), as well as the increasing use of electronic data interchange by surveillance
systems, might promote timeliness (6,29,71,72 ).
D.2.i. Stability
Definition. Stability refers to the reliability (i.e., the ability to collect, manage, and
provide data properly without failure) and availability (the ability to be operational when
it is needed) of the public health surveillance system.
Methods. Measures of the system’s stability can include
• the number of unscheduled outages and down times for the system’s computer;
• the costs involved with any repair of the system’s computer, including parts,
service, and amount of time required for the repair;
• the percentage of time the system is operating fully;
• the desired and actual amount of time required for the system to collect or receive
data;
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• the desired and actual amount of time required for the system to manage the data,
including transfer, entry, editing, storage, and back-up of data; and
• the desired and actual amount of time required for the system to release data.
Discussion. A lack of dedicated resources might affect the stability of a public health
surveillance system. For example, workforce shortages can threaten reliability and avail-
ability. Yet, regardless of the health-related event being monitored, a stable perfor-
mance is crucial to the viability of the surveillance system. Unreliable and unavailable
surveillance systems can delay or prevent necessary public health action.
A more formal assessment of the system’s stability could be made through model-
ing procedures (73 ). However, a more useful approach might involve assessing stabil-
ity based on the purpose and objectives of the system.
Task E. Justify and State Conclusions, and Make
Recommendations
Conclusions from the evaluation can be justified through appropriate analysis, syn-
thesis, interpretation, and judgement of the gathered evidence regarding the perfor-
mance of the public health surveillance system (Task D). Because the stakeholders (Task A)
must agree that the conclusions are justified before they will use findings from the
evaluation with confidence, the gathered evidence should be linked to their relevant
standards for assessing the system’s performance (Task C). In addition, the conclusions
should state whether the surveillance system is addressing an important public health
problem (Task B.1) and is meeting its objectives (Task B.2).
Recommendations should address the modification and/or continuation of the pub-
lic health surveillance system. Before recommending modifications to a system, the
evaluation should consider the interdependence of the system’s costs (Task B.3) and
attributes (Task D.2). Strengthening one system attribute could adversely affect
another attribute of a higher priority. Efforts to improve sensitivity, PVP, representative-
ness, timeliness, and stability can increase the cost of a surveillance system, although
savings in efficiency with computer technology (e.g., electronic reporting) might offset
some of these costs. As sensitivity and PVP approach 100%, a surveillance system is
more likely to be representative of the population with the event under surveillance.
However, as sensitivity increases, PVP might decrease. Efforts to increase sensitivity
and PVP might increase the complexity of a surveillance system — potentially decreas-
ing its acceptability, timeliness, and flexibility. In a study comparing health-department–
initiated (active) surveillance and provider-initiated (passive) surveillance, for example,
the active surveillance did not improve timeliness, despite increased sensitivity (61 ). In
addition, the recommendations can address concerns about ethical obligations in
operating the system (74 ).
In some instances, conclusions from the evaluation indicate that the most appropri-
ate recommendation is to discontinue the public health surveillance system; however,
this type of recommendation should be considered carefully before it is issued. The
cost of renewing a system that has been discontinued could be substantially greater
than the cost of maintaining it. The stakeholders in the evaluation should consider
relevant public health and other consequences of discontinuing a surveillance system.
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Task F. Ensure Use of Evaluation Findings and Share
Lessons Learned
Deliberate effort is needed to ensure that the findings from a public health surveil-
lance system evaluation are used and disseminated appropriately. When the evalua-
tion design is focused (Task C), the stakeholders (Task A) can comment on decisions
that might affect the likelihood of gathering credible evidence regarding the system’s
performance. During the implementation of the evaluation (Tasks D and E), considering
how potential findings (particularly negative findings) could affect decisions made about
the surveillance system might be necessary. When conclusions from the evaluation
and recommendations are made (Task E), follow-up might be necessary to remind
intended users of their planned uses and to prevent lessons learned from becoming
lost or ignored.
Strategies for communicating the findings from the evaluation and recommenda-
tions should be tailored to relevant audiences, including persons who provided data
used for the evaluation. In the public health community, for example, a formal written
report or oral presentation might be important but not necessarily the only means of
communicating findings and recommendations from the evaluation to relevant audi-
ences. Several examples of formal written reports of surveillance evaluations have
been included in peer-reviewed journals (51,53,57,59,75 ).
SUMMARY
The guidelines in this report address evaluations of public health surveillance
systems. However, these guidelines could also be applied to several systems, including
health information systems used for public health action, surveillance systems that are
pilot tested, and information systems at individual hospitals or health-care centers.
Additional information can also be useful for planning, establishing, as well as effi-
ciently and effectively monitoring a public health surveillance system (6–7 ).
To promote the best use of public health resources, all public health surveillance
systems should be evaluated periodically. No perfect system exists; however, and
trade-offs must always be made. Each system is unique and must balance benefit ver-
sus personnel, resources, and cost allocated to each of its components if the system is
to achieve its intended purpose and objectives.
The appropriate evaluation of public health surveillance systems becomes para-
mount as these systems adapt to revised case definitions, new health-related events,
new information technology (including standards for data collection and sharing), cur-
rent requirements for protecting patient privacy, data confidentiality, and system secu-
rity. The goal of this report has been to make the evaluation process inclusive, explicit,
and objective. Yet, this report has presented guidelines — not absolutes — for the evalu-
ation of public health surveillance systems. Progress in surveillance theory, technol-
ogy, and practice continues to occur, and guidelines for evaluating a surveillance system
will necessarily evolve.
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Appendix A.
Checklist for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems
Tasks for evaluating a surveillance system* Page(s) in this report
 Task A. Engage the stakeholders in the evaluation 4
 Task B. Describe the surveillance system to be evaluated 4–11
 1. Describe the public health importance of the health-related event under surveillance 4– 5
 a. Indices of frequency
 b. Indices of severity
 c. Disparities or inequities associated with the health-related event
 d. Costs associated with the health-related event
 e. Preventability
 f. Potential future clinical course in the absence of an intervention
 g. Public interest
 2. Describe the purpose and operation of the surveillance system 5–10
 a. Purpose and objectives of the system
 b. Planned uses of the data from the system
 c. Health-related event under surveillance, including case definition
 d. Legal authority for data collection
 e. The system resides where in organization(s)
 f. Level of integration with other systems, if appropriate
 g. Flow chart of system
 h. Components of system
 1) Population under surveillance
 2) Period of time of data collection
 3) Data collection
4)Reporting sources of data
 5) Data management
 6) Data analysis and dissemination
 7) Patient privacy, data confidentiality, and system security
 8) Records management program
 3. Describe the resources used to operate the surveillance system 10–11
 a. Funding source(s)
 b. Personnel requirements
 c. Other resources
 Task C. Focus the evaluation design 11–12
 1. Determine the specific purpose of the evaluation
 2. Identify stakeholders who will receive the findings and recommendations of the evaluation
 3. Consider what will be done with the information generated from the evaluation
 4. Specify the questions that will be answered by the evaluation
 5. Determine standards for assessing the performance of the system
 Task D. Gather credible evidence regarding the performance of the surveillance system 13–24
 1. Indicate the level of usefulness 13–14
 2. Describe each system attribute 14–24
 a. Simplicity
 b. Flexibility
 c. Data quality
 d. Acceptability
 e. Sensitivity




 Task E. Justify and state conclusions, and make recommendations 24
 Task F. Ensure use of evaluation findings and share lessons learned 25
* Adapted from Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health [CDC. Framework for program evaluation in
public health. MMWR 1999;48(RR-11)] and the original guidelines [CDC. Guidelines for evaluating surveillance
systems. MMWR 1988;37(No. S-5)].
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Appendix B.
Cross-reference of Tasks and Relevant Standards
Tasks for evaluating a surveillance system* Relevant standards†
Task A. Engage the stakeholders Stakeholder identification. Persons involved in or
in the evaluation. affected by the evaluation should be identified so that
their needs can be addressed.
Evaluator credibility. The persons conducting the
evaluation should be trustworthy and competent in
performing the evaluation to ensure that findings from
the evaluation achieve maximum credibility and
acceptance.
Formal agreements. If applicable, all principal
parties involved in an evaluation should agree in
writing to their obligations (i.e., what is to be done,
how, by whom, and when) so that each party must
adhere to the conditions of the agreement or
renegotiate them.
Rights of human subjects. The evaluation should
be designed and conducted in a manner that respects
and protects the rights and welfare of human subjects.
Human interactions. Evaluators should interact
respectfully with other persons associated with an
evaluation so that participants are not threatened or
harmed.
Conflict of interest. Conflict of interest should be
handled openly and honestly so that the evaluation
processes and results are not compromised.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be forma-
tively and summatively evaluated against these and
other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
Task B. Describe the surveillance system Complete and fair assessment. The evaluation
to be evaluated. should be complete and fair in its examination and
recording of strengths and weaknesses of the system
so that strengths can be enhanced and problem areas
addressed.
System documentation. The system being
evaluated should be documented clearly and
accurately.
Context analysis. The context in which the system
exists should be examined in enough detail to identify
probable influences on the system.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be
formatively and summatively evaluated against these
and other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
Task C.  Focus the evaluation design. Evaluation impact. Evaluations should be planned,
conducted, and reported in ways that encourage
follow-through by stakeholders to increase the
likelihood of the evaluation being used.
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Appendix B. — Continued
Cross-reference of Tasks and Relevant Standards
Tasks for evaluating a surveillance system* Relevant standards†
Task C. (Continued ) Focus the evaluation design. Practical procedures. Evaluation procedures should
be practical while needed information is being
obtained to keep disruptions to a minimum.
Political viability. During the planning and
conducting of the evaluation, consideration should be
given to the varied positions of interest groups so that
their cooperation can be obtained and possible
attempts by any group to curtail evaluation operations
or to bias or misapply the results can be averted or
counteracted.
Cost-effectiveness. The evaluation should be
efficient and produce valuable information to justify
expended resources.
Service orientation. The evaluation should be
designed to assist organizations in addressing and
serving effectively the needs of the targeted
participants.
Complete and fair assessment. The evaluation
should be complete and fair in its examination and
recording of strengths and weaknesses of the system
so that strengths can be enhanced and problem areas
addressed.
Fiscal responsibility. The evaluator’s allocation and
expenditure of resources should reflect sound
accountability procedures by being prudent and
ethically responsible so that expenditures are
accountable and appropriate.
Described purpose and procedures. The purpose
and procedures of the evaluation should be monitored
and described in enough detail to identify and assess
them.  The purpose of evaluating a surveillance
system is to promote the best use of public health
resources by ensuring that only important problems
are under surveillance and that surveillance systems
operate efficiently.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be
formatively and summatively evaluated against these
and other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
Task D. Gather credible evidence Information scope and selection. Information
regarding the performance of the collected should address pertinent questions
surveillance system. regarding the system and be responsive to the needs
and interests of clients and other specified
stakeholders.
Defensible information sources. Sources of
information used in the system evaluation should be
described in enough detail to assess the adequacy of
the information.
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Appendix B. — Continued
Cross-reference of Tasks and Relevant Standards
Tasks for evaluating a surveillance system* Relevant standards†
Task D. (Continued ) Gather credible evidence Valid information. Information-gathering
regarding the performance of the procedures should be developed and implemented to
surveillance system. ensure a valid interpretation for the intended use.
Reliable information. Information-gathering
procedures should be developed and implemented to
ensure sufficiently reliable information for the
intended use.
Systematic information. Information collected,
processed, and reported in an evaluation should be
systematically reviewed and any errors corrected.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be
formatively and summatively evaluated against these
and other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
Task E. Justify and state conclusions, Values identification. The perspectives, procedures,
and make recommendations. and rationale used to interpret the findings should be
carefully described so that the bases for value
judgments are clear.
Analysis of information. Information should be
analyzed appropriately and systematically so that
evaluation questions are answered effectively.
Justified conclusions. Conclusions that are reached
should be explicitly justified for stakeholders’
assessment.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be
formatively and summatively evaluated against these
and other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
Task F. Ensure use of evaluation findings Evaluator credibility. The persons conducting the
and share lessons learned. evaluation should be trustworthy and competent in
performing the evaluation to ensure that findings from
the evaluation achieve maximum credibility and
acceptance.
Report clarity. Evaluation reports should clearly
describe the system being evaluated, including its
context and the purposes, procedures, and findings of
the evaluation so that essential information is provided
and easily understood.
Report timeliness and dissemination. Substantial
interim findings and evaluation reports should be
disseminated to intended users so that they can be
used in a timely fashion.
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Appendix B. — Continued
Cross-reference of Tasks and Relevant Standards
Tasks for evaluating a surveillance system* Relevant standards†
Task F. Ensure use of the findings of the evaluation Evaluation impact. Evaluations should be planned,
and share lessons learned. conducted, and reported in ways that encourage
follow-through by stakeholders to increase the
likelihood of the evaluation being used.
Disclosure of findings. The principal parties of an
evaluation should ensure that the full evaluation
findings with pertinent limitations are made accessible
to the persons affected by the evaluation and any
others with expressed legal rights to receive the
results.
Impartial reporting. Reporting procedures should
guard against the distortion caused by personal
feelings and biases of any party involved in the
evaluation so that the evaluation reflects the findings
fairly.
Metaevaluation. The evaluation should be
formatively and summatively evaluated against these
and other pertinent standards to guide its conduct
appropriately and, on completion, to enable close
examination of its strengths and weaknesses by
stakeholders.
* Adapted from Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health [CDC. Framework for program evaluation in
public health. MMWR 1999;48(RR–11)] and the original guidelines [CDC. Guidelines for evaluating surveillance
systems. MMWR 1988;37(No. S-5)].
† Adapted from Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health [CDC. Framework for program evaluation in
public health. MMWR 1999;48(RR-11)].
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GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
This MMWR updates methods and tasks for evaluating a public health surveillance system. The goal of this report
is to guide public health personnel and other interested parties through the assessment of a surveillance system
using the Framework for Program Evaluation in Public Health in addition to the elements in the original guidelines
for surveillance evaluation published in 1988. Upon completion of this educational activity, the reader should be
able to a) outline the six tasks necessary to evaluate a surveillance system; b) list and define the nine system
attributes that provide credible evidence of a system’s performance; and c) describe steps for making
recommendations and ensuring use of the evaluation’s findings.
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
1. Data from a public health surveillance system can be used to
A. Monitor trends in the burden of disease, including detection of epidemics.
B. Measure the burden of disease, including changes in populations at risk.
C. Prioritize allocation of health resources.
D. Provide the basis for epidemiologic research.
E. All of the above.
2. Because of advances in technology and information architecture, new concerns for
evaluation of surveillance systems include
A. User interface.
B. Adherence to confidentiality and security standards.
C. Data format and coding.
D. All of the above.
E. A and C.
3. Engaging stakeholders in the evaluation process will help ensure all of the following
except
A. That the evaluation will address appropriate questions.
B. That pertinent attributes will be described and addressed.
C. That the findings will be acceptable and useful.
D. That the effect of the recommended changes will be minimal.
E. That persons or organizations that have an investment in the system will be
represented.
4. A case definition for the health-related event under surveillance can include all of the
following except
A. Level of diagnostic certainty.
B. Level of statistical certainty.
C. Epidemiologic information.
D. Clinical manifestations of the health-related event.
E. Laboratory results.
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E. All of the above.
6. Sensitivity of a surveillance system describes
A. The ability of the system to detect outbreaks.
B. The likelihood that a case reported to the surveillance system is a true case.
C. The proportion of cases of a health event detected by the surveillance system.
D. All of the above.
E. A and C.
7. Representativeness of a surveillance system
A. Is not affected by case ascertainment bias.
B. Can be assessed by comparing characteristics of reported events to all such events.
C. Does not affect the generalizability of the surveillance system.
D. All of the above.
E. A and C.
8. Conclusions of and recommendations from the evaluation of the surveillance system
A. Should be made based on credible evidence collected throughout the evaluation.
B. Should state whether the system is meeting its objectives.
C. Should not recommend discontinuation of a system.
D. All of the above.
E. A and B.
9. Ensuring the use of the evaluation’s findings is enhanced by
A. Deliberate effort to disseminate the findings.
B. Excluding stakeholders from development of recommendations.
C. Reporting findings in a single and consistent format.
D. Disseminating findings only to those who can carry out recommendations.
E. Including a diagram that describes the data flow within the system.
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10. Indicate your work setting.
A. State/local health department.
B. Other public health setting.
C. Hospital clinic/private practice.
D. Managed care organization.
E. Academic institution.
F. Other.
11. Which best describes your professional activities?
A. Patient care — emergency/urgent care department.
B. Patient care — inpatient.




12. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for ... (Indicate all that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other.








14. How much time did you spend reading this report and completing the exam?
A. 1–1.5 hours.
B. More than 1.5 hours but fewer than 2 hours.
C. 2–2.5 hours.
D. More than 2.5 hours.
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15. After reading this report, I am confident that I can outline the six tasks necessary to
evaluate a surveillance system.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
16. After reading this report, I am confident that I can list and define the nine system
attributes that provide credible evidence of a system’s performance.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
17. After reading this report, I am confident that I can describe steps for making rec-
ommendations and ensuring use of the evaluation’s findings.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
18. The objectives are relevant to the goal of this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
19. The tables, figures, and appendices are useful.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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Correct answers for questions 1–9
1.E  2.D 3.D  4.B  5.E  6.E  7.B  8.E  9.A
20. Overall, the presentation of the report enhances my ability to understand the material.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
21. These recommendations will affect my practice.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
22.  How did you learn about this continuing education activity?
A. Internet.
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MMWR Response Form for Continuing Education Credit
July 27, 2001/Vol. 50/No. RR-13
Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems
Recommendations from the Guidelines Working Group
To receive continuing education credit, you must
1. provide your contact information;
2. indicate your choice of CME, CEU, or CNE credit;
3. answer all of the test questions;
4. sign and date this form or a photocopy;
5. submit your answer form by July 27, 2002.
Failure to complete these items can result in a delay or rejection of
your application for continuing education credit.
Last Name First Name
Street Address or P.O. Box
Apartment or Suite
City State ZIP Code
Phone Number Fax Number
E-Mail Address
Fill in the appropriate blocks to indicate your answers. Remember, you must answer all of the
questions to receive continuing education credit!
1. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 12. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
2. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 13. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E [ ] F
3. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 14. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D
4. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 15. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
5. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 16. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
6. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 17. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
7. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 18. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
8. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 19. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
9. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E 20. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
10. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E [ ] F 21. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E
11. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E [ ] F 22. [ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] D [ ] E [ ] F





















References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to MMWR
readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their
programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is
not responsible for the content of pages found at these sites.
Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not
imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
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